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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

;

DARRELL LAWRENCE WESSENDORF,

:

Case No.

880186

Defendant-Appellant.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF COURT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal
pursuant to 78-2a-3(f) of Utah Code.
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the conviction of appellant of
the crime of manslaughter, a second degree felony, in the Fifth
Judicial District Court in and for the County of Washington, by
the court sitting without a jury.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. THE DEATH OF THE CHILD WAS CAUSED BY ACCIDENTAL MEANS
AND NOT HOMICIDE BY APPELLANT, BUT AT MOST WAS A NEGLIGENT
HOMICIDE AND NOT MANSLAUGHTER.
A. The Death of the Child Was Accidental and Not
Homicide.
B. The Standard to Determine Intent of the Actor,
Applicable In This Case Should Be a Subjective Standard
and Not an Objective Standard.
II.
THE DEATH OF THE CHILD WAS CAUSED BY THE INTERVENING
TREATMENT OB NEGLIGENCE OF THE TREATING PHYSICIAN AND SAID
NEGLIGENCE SHOULD BE A DEFENSE TO APPELLANT.
A. The Treating Physicians Underprescribed Antivenin
and Said Lack of Antivenin Was the Proximate Cause of
the Death of the Victim.
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B. The state Did
That the Cause of
Intubation of the
Which Resulted in

Not Prove Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Death Was Not as a Result of Improper
Victim by the Treating Personnel,
Her Death

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
Section 76-5-205 (See Addendum)
Section 76-5-206 (See Addendum)
Section 76-2-103 (See Addendum)

STATEMENT OF CASE
Defendant-appellant was charged with 2nd Degree Murder,
a first degree felony, arising out of the death of-Stevie
Kirkwood, a two-and-one-half year old female child, bitten by a
rattlesnake.
Appellant was tried before the court sitting without a
jury.
The trial judge found appellant not guilty of 2nd
degree murder, but guilty of manslaughter, a 2nd degree felony
and appellant was sentenced to the statutory penalty of 1 year to
15 years in the Utah State Penitentiary.
FACTS
On the morning of May 7, 1987 the appellant was picked
up by Willis Kelton at the heme of Jeri Ann and Marshall
Kirkwood, in LaVerkin, Utah.
Appellant ostensibly rented a room upstairs in the
Kirkwood home, but as time passed, in actuality, the relationship
between him and Jeri Ann Kirkwood developed into an intimate one
with him occupying her room, with her, whenever her husband, a
truck driver, was away from the home.
2

(T.380-383)

On the 7th, Kelton and appellant departed for Cedar
City, but had not gone tar when they spotted a snake by the side
of the road.

Mr. Kelton stopped and they went back and caught

the snake, a rattlesnake, and took it back to the Kirkwood home.
This happened about 10:00 a.m.

Appellant handled the

snake for a time, then put it in a gunny sack and hung it' in a
tree, asking Mrs. Kirkwood to move the sack to shade if the sun
got on it.

Then Kelton and appellant again departed for Cedar

City, returning about 12:30 to 1:00 p.m.

In the interim, Mrs..

Kirkwood went to St. George, returning about 3:00 p.m. (T.21)
Upon returning from Cedar City, appellant spent about
two hours taming the snake and allowing it to get used to being
handled.

He petted the snakef allowed it to crawl over and

around him, and picked it up and handled it many times. (T.394,
T.310)
It was approximately 3:00 p.m. when Mrs. Kirkwood
returned from St. George, about the time the neighborhood
children were returning from school.

By then, the appellant's

handling of the snake had progressed to the stage where he was
carrying the snake around his neck, kissing the snake's head,
putting the snake down his pants, and generally handling the
snake with no fear or concern that he might be bitten. (T.27,
T.399)
After a while, the appellant took the snake inside the
home and into the bathroom where Stevie Kirkwood, the 2 year old
daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Kirkwood, was playing with a kitten. (T.
402)

Kelton followed him in and Mrs. Kirkwood chose to enter
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through a window in her bedroom.

(T.400) Mrs. Kirkwood obtained

a gun from her bedroom and went to the bathroom. (T.29)
Stevie Kirkwood was in the bathroom playing with the
kittens.

Appellant was kneeling behind her and the snake was f at

least, partially resting on her shoulder. (T.29)

Appellant was

also supporting it with his hand preparatory to showing fiow a
rattlesnake is "milked".

(T.320)

Mrs. Kirkwood panicked and

said for him to get the snake off her daughter, all the while
holding a gun. (T.29)

Mrs. Kirkwood admitted considering

shooting appellant, (T.30) and admitted threatening to shoot him,
(T.59) He saw what he thought was something being thrown at him,
turned abruptly and at that moment, for whatever reason, the
snake bit Stevie on the shoulder. (T.404)
Appellant peeled the snake's fangs out of the child's
shoulder and immediately proceeded to lacerate the wound with his
pocket-knife and to attempt to suck the venom from the wound. (T.
405)
Mrs. Kirkwood followed Kelton outside, who had been
given the snake and shot it. (T.30, T.60)
Thereafter a confused dispute and scuffle ensued, Mrs.
Kirkwood claiming she was trying to get the child to take it to
the hospital (T.30) and the appellant insisting he was trying to
administer emergency first aid and get to his truck where he had
a snakebite kit to further treat the bite. (T.405, T.409)
A scuffle also developed between appellant and Kelton.
Mrs. Kirkwood insisting it was the appellant trying to keep her
from taking the child to the hospital (T.31) and appellant
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insisting he himself wanted to go to the hospital with Mrs.
Kirkwood and the child rather than Kelton, whom he thought was
not as capable of safely driving as he was. (T. 412)
The child was at the hospital 15 to 20 minutes after
leaving LaVerkin. (T.33).

Mrs. Kirkwood testified appellant

delayed her departure tor 20 to 25 minutes. (T.34), but Kelton
admitted he had testified at the preliminary hearing, held much
closer to the time of the incident, that it had been 5 minutes or
maybe less trom the time of the bite until they were on their way
to St. George to the hospital. (T. 327)

That would have been 20

to 25 minutes that the child was at the hospital after the bite.
The child, Stevie Kirkwood, was treated with a maximum
of 1 and 1/2 vials of anti-venom medication. (T.195, T.509).
Initially the child was diagnosed by the treating
doctor to be improving, (T.108) then suddenly had a respiratory
arrest and died. (T.108)
The appellant, who was intimate with the child's mother
considered the children of Jeri Kirkwood almost as if his own
children. (T.39, T.383-385, T.453-4b5)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant was found not guilty of 2nd degree murder,
but guilty of manslaughter, a 2nd degree felony and sentenced
pursuant to statute to prison.
The death of the child, Stevie Kirkwood was accidental,
there was no intent to cause harm to said child by the appellant.
Even if there was negligence on the part of appellant,
the court, sitting without a jury, misinterpreted the law of the
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State of Utah and applied an objective standard concerning the
knowledge and intent of the appellant when it should have hmnn a
subjective standard.
Had the proper standard been applied, the most
appellant could have been convicted of was negligent homicide, a
Class A misdemeanor and not manslaughter, a 2nd degree felony.
Furthermore, appellant should have been exonerated of
responsibility for the death of the child because the treating
physicians were, in fact, the actual cause of the death of said
child, because they wrongfully and negligently drastically
underprescribed and under-administered antivenin to the child
when brought to the hospital for treatment, which was the actual
cause of death rather than the initial bite by the snake.
In addition, there was evidence that the child was
improperly intubated by the treating physicians, and other
personnel at the hospital and the State, which has the burden of
proof, did not prove that said improper intubation was not the
cause of death of the child.
ARGUMENT
While appellant had been originally charged with
second degree murder, he was convicted of manslaughter by the
court sitting without a jury.
Appellant submits that it was error to convict him of
manslaughter; that he should have been either accjuitted on the
grounds that the death of the child was accidental, and/or
because there was an intervening cause, but at most, appellant
should have only been convicted of criminal negligence.
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There was little or no dispute that appellant loved the
deceased child, Stevie Kirkwood, as if she were his own child.
The testimony of the mother (T.39), together with the testimony
ot the appellant (T.383-385) and of a close friend and one-time
foster parent of the appellant, Cloyd (Buck) Crofts, (T. 453-455)
demonstrates that appellant was the paramour of the mother and
dearly loved the child.

Indeed, even the trial judge found, as a

matter of fact, that in his opinion appellant"... loved Stevie
Kirkwood; that he had genuine affection for other members of her
family; that he had no desire or intent to harm her..."
(Sentencing Transcript 5, lines 18-21 [See addendum])
It is with the above circumstance in mind that the
statutes of Utah and the facts of this case must be considered.
1.

THE DEATH OF THE CHILD WAS CAUSED BY ACCIDENTAL

MEANS AND NOT HOMICIDE BY APPELLANT, BUT AT MOST WAS A NEGLIGENT
HOMICIDE AND NOT MANSLAUGHTER.
A*

The Death of the Child Was Accidental and Not

Homicide.
Appellant submits that the incident was purely and
simply an accident and he should not have been convicted of any
offense whatever.
As stated in 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide, Section 112, page
406:
"Where it appears that a killing was
unintentional, that the perpetrator acted
with no wrongful purpose in doing the
homicidal act, that it was done while he was
engaged in a lawful enterprise, and that it
was not the result of negligence, the
homicide will be excused on the score of
accident or misadventure. . . . Action
7

accompanied, not only with no intent to do
harm, but also with a reasonable belief that
no harm is possible, is clearly wanting in
every essential element of crime."
The facts as shown by the transcript and as will be
referred to hereinafter with reference to other issues
demonstrate this death to be purely accidental.
But if appellant v/as deemed to be negligent, he should
certainly not have been convicted of manslaughter.
B.

The Standard to Determine Intent of the Actor

Applicable in this Case Should be a Subjective Standard and Not
an Objective Standard.
The court convicted appellant of manslaughter, as
defined in Section 76-5-205 of Utah Code, presumably, subsection
(a) thereof.
Section 76-5-205 reads as follows:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes
manslaughter if the actor:
(a) recklessly causes the death of
another; or
(b) causes the death of another under
circumstances where the actor reasonably
believes the circumstances provide a legal
justification or excuse for his conduct
although the conduct is not legally
justifiable or excusable under the
existing circumstances.
(2) Under Subsection (l)(b), emotional
disturbance does not include a condition
resulting from mental illness as defined in
Section 76-2-305.
(3) The reasonableness of an explanation or
excuse under Subsection (a)(b), or the
reasonable belief of the actor under
Subsection (a)(c), shall be determined from
the viewpoint of a reasonable person under
the then existing circumstances.
(4) Manslaughter is a felony of the second
degree.
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The Negligent Homicide section, 76-5-206, reads as
follows:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal
negligence, causes the death of another,
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor.
Whether appellant is guilty of manslaughter or of
negligent homicide depends, then, upon whether appellant caused
the death of another
criminal negligence

(a), recklessly

(manslaughter), or (b) with

(Negligent Homicide).

If he did neither,

then, of course, he should have been acquitted.
Appellant submits that the death of Stevie Kirkwood was
indeed an accident, but if that accident was caused by the
appellant's negligence, then he is guilty of no more than
negligent homicide and not manslaughter as the trial court
erroneously

found.

The definition of the elements of either manslaughter
or negligent homicide are found in subparagraph
(manslaughter) or subparagraph

(3)

(4), (negligent homicide), of

76-2-103, quoted below:
76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or
with intent or willfully";
"knowingly, or with knowledge";
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and
"Criminal negligence or criminally
negligent."
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or
willfully with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when
it is his conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with
respect to his conduct or to circumstances
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of
the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or

9

with knowledge, with respect to a result of
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct
is reasonably certain to cause the result,
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or
the result of his conduct when he is aware of
but consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that its
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from
the standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise under all the circumstances as
viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is
criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the
result of his conduct when he ought to be
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the circumstances exist or the result
will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the failure to
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.
(Emphasis added)
Because extensive research has turned up no homicide
prosecutions arising out of rattlesnake bites

(There have been

civil cases alleging negligence and there was a case where a
rattlesnake was placed in the victim's mailbox, but the victim
did not die so no homicide charge was involved) analogies to
other situations must be used to provide guidance.
In

State v. Dyer

671

P.2nd

142 (Utah, 1983) the

defendant was convicted of negligent homicide for the shooting
death of his girlfriend, and appealed claiming that he should
have been acquitted.

The defendant, his brother Robert, and the

girlfriend were together at a private club drinking alcoholic
beverages.
got home.

Defendant was heavily intoxicated by the time they
Robert objected when defendant said he was taking the
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car and going to his girlfriend's house tor the night, and an
argument ensued in which Robert finally grabbed defendant by the
throat and proceeded to hit and strangle him until he felt sorry
for taking advantage of his intoxicated brother and let him go.
In the meantime, the girlfriend had gone upstairs.

Defendant

went immediately to his bedroom, and Robert followed to the
doorway.

Robert saw defendant backing out of a closet with a

.30-.30 caliber rifle in his hand.

'.,

The rifle was fired, striking

the door trame 5 feet above the floor and just two feet to the
side of Robert.

Unbeknown to either Robert or the defendant, the

girlfriend had come downstairs and was standing outside the
bedroom.

After passing through the door frame, a fragment struck

the girlfriend in the head and killed her.

Robert called for

emergency assistance.
An information originally was filed charging the
defendant with second degree murder under §76-5-203, as was done
in this case.

Five months later, however, by an amended

information, the charge was reduced to manslaughter, and

after a

jury trial, defendant was found guilty of negligent homicide.
At trial, Robert testified that his brother, the
defendant, neither threatened him with the gun nor aimed it at
him, and that he did not see or hear the gun being loaded.
However, a neighbor testified that she heard profane,
argumentative, and threatening language and that just before she
heard the gunshot, one male voice said, distressfully, "Not that.
Not that."

Also, the police found, in an open drawer next to

where defendant had been standing when the gun discharged, two
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spent cartridges and a box of .30-.30 ammunition.

When the

police arrived, defendant at first lied and told them he and his
brother had been discussing the deer hunt and admiring the gun
when it accidentally discharged.
On appeal, the Court analyzed the distinction between
manslaughter and negligent homicide.

The Court said that the

mental state that must be proven ". . .to sustain a conviction of
negligent homicide, is criminal negligence" and that the mental
state that must be proven to sustain a conviction of reckless
manslaughter is "recklessness".
76-2-103(3) and

The Court then cited Section

(4) defining those mental states as follows:

"A person engages in conduct:
. . . .

(3)
Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to the
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of
his conduct when he is aware of but consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The
risk must be of such a nature and degree that its
disregard
constitutes
a gross
deviation
from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise
under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.
(4)
With
criminal
negligence
or
is
criminally
negligent with respect to the circumstances surrounding
his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought
to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the circumstances exist or the result will occur.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the
actor's standpoint."
(Emphasis A d d e d ) .
The Court then concluded that:
"The only difference between reckless and criminally
negligent
conduct
is that
under
the former, one
perceives a risk and consciously disregards it, whereas
under the latter, one fails to even perceive the risk.
The risk in both cases must be of such a degree that an
ordinary
person
would
not disregard
or
fail
to
recognize it. The distinction, then, is merely one of
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the degree
Added.)

of

perception

of

the

risk."

(Emphasis

The Court adopted Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Boggess
v. State (Utah, 1982) 655 P.2d 654 and held that:
"The gravamen of the crime of negligent homicide is the
same as that for reckless manslaughter.
The only
distinction between the two crimes is the mental state
of the defe ndant at the time the crime was cdmmitted.
In one, the actor perceives the risk but unreasonably
disregards it; in the othe:r, he simply negligently
fails to perceive the risk." (Emphasis Added) ._
In

the

instant

case

manslaughter

is

not

warranted

because it requires, at the minimum, that the appellant must be
consciously

(subjectively)

aware

of

unjustifiable

risk of causing a death and that he consciously

(subjectively) disregards that risk.

a

substantial

and

Here, it is obvious that

the appellant was not aware of any such risk, as demonstrated by
his conduct

in handling

the

snake

(allowing

it to hang

loose

around his own neck, kissing it, putting it down his pants etc.)
(T.

394, T.310,

T.27,

T.399)

and

by

his

statements

to

the

Churches, Willis Kelton and Mrs. Kirkwood and others, just prior,
to the tragedy, that the snake was "mellow" and that it was not
dangerous.

(T. 26, T.48, T.84, T.474) Appellant

was

terribly

wrong, as the result proves, but that does not change the fact
that "subjectively" he was unaware of any such risk at the time.
Appellant's
unreasonable

as

perhaps,

those

handling

the

failure

it

may

who

seem

kept

snake),

to
to

their

especially

perceive
ordinary

distance
with

hindsight, may have been criminally
more

than

that.

He

was

not
13

the

the

risk,

as

(such

as,

appellant

was

persons

while

benefit

of

perfect

negligent but warrants no

consciously

disregarding

a

substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist
or the result will occur as is necessary for manslaughter.
The Utah
rehearing

Supreme Court, in a modified

opinion

after

in the recent case of State v. Bryan 709 P. 2nd

257

(Utah 1985) made it clear that a subjective test applies to a
charge

of

manslaughter
homicide.

manslaughter.

In

conviction

reversed

was

that

case
and

the

reduced

defendant's
to

negligent

There the Court said:
"Under the criminal code, a defendant, to have acted
with 'recklessness', must be consciously, and therefore
subjectively, aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk of causing a death. See §76-2-103(3).
. . . .

Under the manslaughter statute, the defendant must have
actually known of the risks; simply disregarding risks
which he should have been aware of is not sufficient to
sustain a conviction under that provision." (Emphasis
Added).
Likewise, in State v. Watts 675 P.2d 566 (Utah, 1983)
the Court said that if the "manifestations of the defendant's
conduct shows that he failed "to perceive the risk of death,
§76-2-103(4)", that constitutes "criminal negligence"; while "his
conscious awareness of, but equally conscious disregard for, the
probable consequences of his conduct, §76-2-103(3)" constitutes
manslaughter.
Appellant had lived with the Kirkwood1s for three or
four months prior to May 7, 1987 and had actually grown to love
Stevie, as Mrs. Kirkwood acknowledged during trial (T. 40) and as
the trial Judge found (Sentencing Transcript: 5 [see addendum]).
Not only did he love Stevie, but as the evidence showed,
defendant was a paramour of Mrs. Kirkwood.

Although she was

married, Mr. Kirkwood was a truck driver and was absent for long
14

periods of time.

Appellant had no reason to harm either Mrs.

Kirkwood or Stevie.

There is not a scintilla of evidence that he

acted with any intent or knowledge to cause bodily harm to

them,

much less death.
As pointed out no reported cases of homicide
prosecutions arising out of a snakebite have been found, so we
must analogize the circumstances of this case to other types of
homicide prosecutions*
For example, if we compare carrying a snake around to
carrying a firearm around, then plenty of cases are available for
study.

However, Appellant reminds the Court that firearms carry

a much higher risk of death than rattlesnakes, so even the
analogies weaken by comparison with this case.
In Parker v. State 318 So.2d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) ,
Parker and the decedent were riding in a truck; the decedent was
driving and Parker halt-cocked a pistol and waved it by the
victim's head when it fired.

The evidence showed there was no

animosity between the two men and that they were cousins and
friends.

Parker's conviction of manslaughter was reversed.
Again, in Re Jackson, 45 Ohio App. 2d 243, 74 Ohio Ops

2d 384, 344 N.E.2d 162, a conviction of negligent homicide was
upheld where the evidence showed that the accused picked up a gun
without checking to see if it was loaded, jumped out a window and
began chasing friends around the yard, then ran back into his
house and faced two friends, with the gun still in his hand, at
which time the gun went off, fatally wounding a friend.
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To compare, Mr. Wessendorf picked up a snake he thought was
harmless, or "unloaded", but perhaps he was just as negligent as
the fellow who failed to check the gun.

Also, by holding the

snake close enough for it to strike Stevie, perhaps that is as
negligent as holding a gun pointed at friends.

The snake, like

the gun, went off, and death resulted.
Mr. Wessendorf did not intentionally provoke the snake
to strike nor did he thrust it into Steviefs face in an attempt
to make it strike, thereby distinguishing himself from cases
where the gun, even though believed to be unloaded, is pointed or
aimed and the trigger pulled.
manslaughter verdicts.

Those cases generally result in

Appellant's culpability, if any, is less

than that, or no more than negligent homicide, and should be less
than in those gun cases where the weapon is aimed and the trigger
pulled.

For example, in Marasa v. State (1981, Fla App. D5) 394

So.2d 544, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder
under a Florida statute similar to Utah's "depraved indifference"
statute, in that a second degree murder is the killing of a human
being by "an act imminently dangerous to another and evincing a
depraved mind regardless of human life" but without an intent to
cause death.

On appeal, his conviction was reduced to

manslaughter on the grounds that the evidence was legally
insufficient to support the murder conviction.
That evidence showed that the defendant and others,
including the victim, were having a drug and liquor party.

The

victim, obviously under the influence, stumbled as she returned
from getting a drink of water.

As she sat down on the couch,
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someone said, "Hit her.

She probably won't feel anything",

referring to her "stoned or high" condition.

Meanwhile,

defendant, who had been showing a new gun after emptying, or so
he apparently thought, the cylinder of all cartridges, said, "I
have a better idea", and pointed the gun at her and pulled the
trigger.

The gun fired, killing her.
Defendant's second degree murder conviction was

reversed because the Court held that an act "evincing a depraved
mind" is one which "is done from ill will, hatred, spite, or an
evil intent" and "is of such a nature that the act itself
indicates an indifference to human life", and found that:
". . % we are bound to find the facts are legally
insufficient to support the conviction in one very
important, if not determinative, aspect. There is
absolutely no evidence the appellant's actions were
'done from ill will, hatred, spite, or an evil
intent.
The defendant attempted to rely on Parker, supra, to avoid even a
manslaughter conviction, but the Court justified a manslaughter
result by distinguishing Marasa from Parker by saying:
"Here, the appellant thought he had unloaded the gun,
but hs had not, he pulled the trigger purposely,
apparently, and the gun was pointed at the victim when
he pulled the trigger." (Emphasis Added).
The instant case is distinguished from the Marasa case,
in that there was not anything near the intentional pointing of a
gun or in this case, a snake.
In yet a third Florida case, McMullen v. State (1984,
Fla. App. Dl) 444 So.2d 1063 a manslaughter conviction was held
appropriate.

(Incidentally, this defendant was also charged with

second degree "depraved mind" murder.)

There, the defendant

attempted to shoot a can off the head of an intoxicated friend
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(having been twice successful previously in this foolishness),
but this time he hit his friend in the forehead.

Because another

friend had removed the clip, defendant thought the gun was
unloaded on this third attempt, on which his friend had moved
further away to "make it harder".

The manslaughter conviction

was affirmed because the Court noted the defendant deliberately
aimed the gun and pulled the trigger.
These four cases, Parker, Jackson, Marasa, and McMullin
illustrate the distinction between negligent homicide and
manslaughter.

In Parker a manslaughter conviction was reversed

and in Jackson it was determined to be

negligent homicide where

the circumstances showed that guns the defendants thought were
"unloaded" went off (i.e., the trigger was not consciously
pulled) when they were not being aimed.

Marasa and McMullin, on

the other hand, both resulted in manslaughter convictions where
guns the defendants thought were "unloaded" were aimed and the
trigger pulled.

See also State v. Hardie (Iowa, 1878) 47 Iowa

647 for a manslaughter result when a gun thought totally harmless
(broken) was aimed and fired.
We can compare those cases to the circumstances before
the Court as follows:

the snake is the gun; appellant's "taming"

of the snake and his own experiences with it made him "think" it
was "unloaded", as all these defendants "thought" the guns were
unloaded; holding the snake is like holding a gun; agitating the
snake or making it angry would be like aiming the gun—both
having the potential to "go off"; and the snake striking is like
the gun being fired.

Appellant Wessendorf thought he had a
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harmless snake (an unloaded gun) which he was holding when it
unexpectedly struck (went off). This would amount to no more
than negligent homicide as in Jackson,

If Appellant had been

agitating the snake and trying to make it bite (even though he
thought it was harmless), that would be like aiming an "unloaded"
gun and pulling the trigger, and would be manslaughter.
This comparison comports with Utah's definition of
"recklessly" and "criminal negligence" in Section 76-2-103(3) and
(4) .

A person who aims a gun and consciously pulls the trigger

(even if he "thinks" it is unloaded) is consciously disregarding
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he might be wrong about
the gun, and this is manslaughter.

Appellant did not consciously

"aim" the snake or try to make it strike.

Appellant was holding

a poisonous snake which we may say was dangerous like a gun and
so perhaps he should have been aware that it may strike, or, like
a gun, go off, so that his failure to perceive that risk by
keeping the snake out of striking distance (like the failure to
prevent a gun from being pointed towards a person in case it
fires) could be criminal negligence.
First, in the instant case, the trial judge, sitting
without a jury erred in, at least, two respects.

In rendering

his judgment he erred in his interpretation of the law as
applicable to the facts of this case, when he stated that the
standard applicable in Utah is an objective standard and that itis the "reasonable man" standard.

The court concluded that if it

were a subjective standard, the legislature "...would not have
included the language relating to the 'reasonable man' standard."
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However, the legislature did not use the term
"reasonable man" as the court suggested.

What the legislature

did say is: "...The risk must be of such a nature and degree that
the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all
the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint."
(Emphasis added).
The legislature very specifically said it is the
subjective view of the actor that determines his knowledge and
intent.
Additionally, in the Dyer case and others cited, supra,
the Supreme Court of Utah has made it quite clear that a
subjective not an objective standard applies, contrary to the
trial court's statement:
"The only difference between reckless
(manslaughter) and criminally negligent
conduct negligent homicide is that under the
former, one perceives a risk and consciously
disregards it, whereas under the latter, one
fails to even perceive the risk. The risk in
both cases must be of such a degree that an
ordinary person would not disregard or fail
to recognize it. The distinction, then, is
merely one of the degree of perception of the
risk." (Emphasis Added.) Dyer, Supra.
Secondly, even while, the trial court was ruling that
the objective test should be applied, he was finding that
subjectively the appellant did not perceive the risk.

See the

following:
After discussing the courts perception of the risk
involved, the trial judge stated:

20

Did the defendant know his conduct
created a grave risk of death to another? .1
find that he did not. The definition of
"knowing" as set out in our code is set out
in 76-2-103 Subsection (2). The latter part
of that sections says: "A person acts
knowingly or with knowledge with respect to a
result of his conduct when he is aware that
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause
the result."
In order to find that the defendant knew
that his conduct created a grave risk of
death to another, I would have to find that
he was reasonably certain that if he exposed
that snake to Stevie, that she would be
bitten and die. The evidence just doesn't
support that finding.
This is a subjective analysis which I
base on the fasts that I've heard in the
case. I'm convinced that the defendant
subjectively believed that he had the snake
calmed and somewhat under control, and that
it would not bite.
The defendant obviously had convinced
himself, in spite of the warning that he had
received to the contrary, that the snake was
not dangerous, and that there was no grave
risk of death to anyone under these
circumstances. (Emphasis added) (Sentencing
transcript, page 4-5)
But after finding as a fact that appellant subjectively
was not aware of the risk, the court turned around, and in ruling
on the law, contradicted himself, saying "I further find that the
evidence clearly shows that the defendant was aware of that risk.
And therefore, his acts were reckless and as a result, he was
guilty of manslaughter." (Sentencing transcript p.7) That was a
direct condradiction to his earlier finding, (supra)
The court stated among other things, in justifying his
decision, that appellant, "...As opposed to knowing that he was
going to cause a death, he was aware of a risk."

In that

statement, he inadvertantly made the very distinction between
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manslaughter and negligent homicide and highlighted the error of
his final decision.
To use his apparent rationale, if one carries a gun,
whether it be to hunt, for target practice, or whatever, or if he
provides a ladder for someonefs use, etc. and no matter how
accidently, someone is killed by that gun or climbing on that
ladder, the person who supplies them, is guilty of manslaughter,
because, as the trial court reasoned, the person providing them,
is aware of a risk.

A person getting into an automobile and

driving it, would become subject to a manslaughter conviction, if
no matter how accidently, someone is killed by that
automobile—because the driver is aware of a risk.

Guns,

automobiles, ladders and a lot of other things we encounter in
life present some degree of risk and most of us are aware of that
risk.

Being aware of a risk does not make us guilty of

manslaughter just because someone dies by that instrumentality.
There must be more, according to the Dyer and other cases cited
herein.
B.

Appellant Was Not Aware of and Did Not Consciously

Disgrgard a Substantial and Unjustifiable Risk.
In this case the evidence is overwhelming that while
defendant no doubt knew a snake could bite and that it had some
degree of poisonous quality, he did not understand that it could
or likely would be fatal.

The court found this as a fact.

Appellant had been bitten numerous times himself, he had seen
T.V. documentaries that described the misconception that most
people have of rattlesnakes and he had played with the snake for
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several hours, allowing it to crawl over him, had kissed its
head, had put it down his pants and all manner of things that
clearly show he did not think it would bite, or if it did, that
it would not be fatal.
The facts are, as pointed out by the testimony of Mr.
Glenn, that while rattlesnakes can be fatal, it is an extremely
rare occurrence—less often than if bitten by a bee, probably
less often than if one gets in an automobile and many other
"accepted" things we do in life.

Furthermore, if treated

properly and in good time, there is no reason whatever for a
rattlesnake bite to be fatal.
In the instant case, appellant was one who sincerely
believe he had a special way with animals, including snakes.

See

his account (T. 375-380) culminating in his reporting that he had
not even gone to a hospital when had had himself been bitten by a
rattlesnake as a child:
I never even got sick. I heard you can get sick from
it. But I didn't even—I never got sick. Other than a
little swelling, and, you know, it hurt a little. B u t —
Appellant clearly did not have the inordinate fear of
snakes that the general populace usually has. (See.description by
Glenn of an individual who when bitten, dashed his head against a
rock until he died out of panic and fear of rattlesnakes.)
(T.491) Appellant sincerely believed rattlesnakes are not as
dangerous as most of us, who do not have either the knowledge or
experience with snakes that he himself had, think they are.
Of great importance, then is whether his belief is
justified and is it reasonable?
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Mr, James Glennf research serpentologist with the V.A.
Medical Center in Salt Lake City, Utah, testified extensively
about venemous snakes in the United States.

The facts he

recounted generally contradict the common perceptions that most
"ordinary" people have of rattlesnakes and their toxcicity.

A

few of his quotes are listed but one must read his entire
testimony to truly understand the relative, actual danger of
rattlesnakes.
And there are more venemous reptiles in
the private homes by hobbyists—the amateur
people interested in these animals—than
there are in the institutions in the country.
And I've told you that there's probably 30 or
40 cobras in homes—30 or 40 more cobras in
homes for each one that's in an institution
in this country. (T.492)
Speaking of the difference between a male and a female
of the great basin rattlesnake (this was a male great basin
rattlesnake. [T. 484; 10-11, T. 486; 9-11] )

Well, there's a little bit of
difference. The males—usually the large
males are generally very docile—very gentle.
In fact, it's well known—the great basin
rattlesnake and the midget faded—both in
Utah--are well-known for their lack of
irritable dispositions. Especially once
they're taken out of the wild and captured
and wallowed around for a while. It's very
well-known among people.
Mr. Glenn further pointed out that there are only 10 to
15 deaths resulting from a total of seven or eight thousand
rattlesnake bites in a year in the United States. (T. 492)
is a maximum of 2 tenths of one percent.
testified that even of those few deaths:
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Mr. Glenn also

That

...In fact, most deaths have either been attributed
to undertreatment or not getting the treatment on time.
(T. 494)
The Court must look at appellant in light of his
knowledge and experience presented against the backdrop of the
real danger that rattlesnakes pose, as opposed to the popular
belief of that danger by those of us who have an almost h^strical
fear of anything reptillian.
Subsection (3) of 76-2-103 says that a person engages
in conduct, constituitng manslaughter "...when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the circumstances exist or the result will occur."
The evidence presented at trial overwhelmingly
demonstrated that in actuality, the risk was not very substantial
and unjustifiable, but, more importantly, appellant was certainly
not aware of any substantial and unjustifiable risk and
therefore,

certainly did not consciously disregard such a risk.

All of this, appellant knew and understood, or at
least, thought he knew, and he did not perceive the actual danger
as it turned out, did exist.
Both Dr. Decaria (T.548, T.552, T.554 and T.555) and
Dr. Dunford (T.531-532, T.b34, T.536-537) who examined him as
forensic phsycologists testified that he was totally unaware of
any danger to the child, or anyone else for that matter.
On Page 534 of the transcript, Dr. Dunford summed up
explicity the appellant's understanding and intention when he
said:
From his viewpoint and his background and the
kinds of experiences he had had with snakes in
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the past, I think it was totally reasonable for
him (to not expect harm).
Certainly the evidence adduced at trial supported those
conclusions of Drs. Decaria and Dunford.
While the mother of the child testified that appellant
chased her with the snake and did other things that seemed to
make the appellant out to be some sort of vicious or cruel
individual, the fact is, she was grieved by the death of her
child, was bitter and wanted a degree of revenge.

Several other

witnesses, Allen Shelley (T.468-472, T.474-475), Mrs Church (T.
86, T.88-89, T.91) Mr. Halterman (T.99-100) all testified that
appellant, in fact, did not engage in the kinds of activities
that Mrs. Kirkwood accused him of doing.
Unfortunately, after being pressed by the court to tell
the truth, regardless of what it was, Ginger Hawkins, a friend of
Mrs. Kirkwood, testified that Mrs. Kirkwood had asked her to lie
in court for her.

She stated, after being questioned by counsel

for the state and the court as to why she seemed to be evasive
about a certain question asked her: (T.444)
A. Yes, there was. But there was also—after
this all happened, Jeri (Mrs. Kirkwood) came to
me and asked me to lie for her, and I couldn't.
And so I don't know. I wasn't going to, but
I don't want to see anybody—I don't like to see
Jeri hurt.
It is quite apparent that Mrs. Kirkwood did want to see
appellant hurt at all costs in retribution for the death of her
child, in spite of what the truth may have been.

One can

understand her grief in losing her child, but our system of
jurisprudence cannot let that grief be the cause of a miscarriage
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of justice.

Because of her willingness to suborn perjury, her

entire credibility about this matter is blemished.
Every credible bit of evidence points toward an
accident, possibly, and at most, an accident occassioned by the
negligence of appellant, but certainly he did not unreasonably
disregard a risk that he perceived and understood to exiist.
II.

THE DEATH OF THE CHILD WAS CAUSED BY THE

INTERVENTING TREATMENT OR NEGLIGENCE OF THE TREATING PHYSICIAN
AND SAID NEGLIGENCE SHOULD BE A DEFENSE TO APPELLANT.
A.

The Treating Physicians Underprescribed Antivenin

and Said Lack of Antivenin Was the Proximate Cause of the Death
of the Victim.
The appellant submits that the treatment received by
the deceased child upon her admission to the hospital was totally
inadequate and but for the negligence of the treating physician
the liklihood of her death was so extremely low that appellant
cannot be held responsible tor her death.

The trial court erred

in not concluding and deciding that the said negligent treatment
was a defense.
Testimony of expert witnesses who examined the medicaj:
records of the hospital concluded that at the most, one and
vials of antivenin was administered to the child.

Dr. Richard

Charles Dart, an expert in the treatment of poisonous snakebites
estimated the maximum amount administered to be one and h vials,
while James Glenn, serpentologist and an expert who consults with
the medical profession concerning venemous snakebite cases in
Utah, estimated the maximum administered over a two hour period
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before her death to be one and 1/3 vials of antivenin.

Even Dr.

Callahan, the treating physician, stated that it was indeed his
plan to administer three vials over a period of a couple hours
(T.117), but also admitted that not all of it was entirely used
in that period of time. Confirming that the estimates of from one
and one third to one and one half, to be accurate. (T.125)
In fact, Dr. Callahan further admitted that, according
to the instructions given the administering personnel, the three
vials would not have actually been administered over a period of
two hours, but rather over a period of four hours. (T.127)
Dr. Dart,

pointed out that the case according to the

medical records, was determined to be a severe envenomation when
the child was admitted to the hospital. (T.199)

Though evasive

about it, and in the face of the notations to the contrary in the
medical record, the treating physician

insisted that he only

determined the envenomation to be severe after the death of the
child.

(T.120)

Nevertheless, the evidence is clear that it was

recognized as a severe envenomation when the child was first
admitted to the hospital. (St. Exh. 3)

If he did not recognize

it, all the symptoms were there and the treating physicial should
have recognized it as a severe envenomation, and it should have
been treated as such. (T. 199)
Dr. Callahan admitted that he had referred to the
package insert (D. Exh. 17} which is included with every package
of antivenin.

(T.122)

While he initially denied having

referred, as well, to the Physician's Handbook during trial,on
the cross examination,

he agreed that he had admitted that he
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had referred to the Physician's Handbook during the preliminary
hearing and that, in fact, he had referred to it at the time of
treatment. (T. 123-124)
Dr. Richard Dart testified that upon the child being
presented to the hospital emergency room with all the symptoms of
a severe envenomation, at a minimum there should have been
administered 10 vials over the first hour and then another 10
vials over the second hour. (T.205)
Dr. Callahan admitted that he had reviewed the Wyeth
Laboratories1 insert sheet referred to above, as well as finally
admitting he had consulted the Physician's Desk Book, and in
fact, all reference sources indicated that a minimum of 10 vials
and up to 15 vials should have been administered immediately!
(T.124)

The sources also, advised, even according to Dr.

Callahan, as well as the other experts, that in the case of small
children, the dosage should be increased. (T.131) (D.Exh. 17)
Dr. Callahan admitted he knew that and also admitted that he did
not do so. (T.13 2)
The overwhelming weight of the evidence is that the
treatment afforded the child was not just minimally inadequate,
but woefully inadequate with absolutely no medical justification
tor that inadequate treatment.

Stevie did not suffer an

anaphylactic shock to the antivenin, the only thing a physician
needs to guard against in the administration of antivenin.
(T.111-112)
The child was taken from the emergency room to the
intensive care unit and almost immediately died. (T.108)
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As the

child's condition appeared to become worse, the administration of
antivenin was not increased, as it should have bean, (T.231) it
was discontinued. (T195-196)
B.

The State Did Not Prove Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

That the Cause of Death was Not as a Result of Improper
Intubation of The Victim by the Treating Personnel, WhicK
Resulted in Her Death.
To compound the problems, Dr. Callahan, the treating
physician insisted at trial that the child, after being admitted
to the hospital, stabilized and began to improve with the initial
treatment. (T.108)

Dr. Callahan then reports that fairly

suddenly, she had a respiratory arrest and then a cardiac
standstill i.e. death. (T.108)
As the medical records show (Sts. Exh.3) and the
testimony confirmed, when the child's condition began to
deteriorate, she was intubated to assist delivering oxygen to the
lungs and almost immediately thereafter she died. (T145-146)
A review of the medical records and according to Dr.
Dart, it was "...striking that the patient was intubated and then
nine minutes later, according to the documentation, had a cardiac
arrest."

The concern of Dr. Dart was that that was a real

indication that the intubation may have been inserted
incorrectly, possibly into the stomach rather then into the
lungs, where it was supposed to have been placed for there to be
that sudden death when in fact, Dr. Callahan had noted she was
improving.

That kind of improper intubation could cause death.
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(T.208) Such incorrect intubation may be unusual, but it is not
unknown and its occurence is well-documented. (T.210)
Dr. Dart testified that the best way to determine if
the tube is properly placed is to do an arterial blood gas test,
as well as other, but less satisfactory, tests. (T.210)
arterial blood gas tests were done in this case.

Such

The fiirst was

done before the patient "decompensated" and showed a need for
intubation.

(T.210)

The second was done 25 minutes after

intubation was done, and showed that there were problems.
third was done in another 15 minutes after the second one.

A
The

taking of those two latter tests, according to Dr. Dart
demonstrated that the treating physicians recognized that a
problem existed. (T.212-213), and as Dr. Dart testified, that the
problem could have very likely been improper intubation (T. 213)
which as noted above could cause death.

However, contrary to

state law, according to Dr. Edwin Sweeney, State Medical
Examiner, (T.163) the tube was removed by hospital personnel from
the body of the child after its death and before shipment of the
body to the lab for an autopsy so that it could not be determined
if the intubation had been done correctly. (T.155)
Dr. Sweeney also confirmed that improper intubation may
well cause death, (T.164) but that, contrary to law, the tube had
been removed so he could not tell at the autopsy whether it had
been improperly placed. (T. 164)

Nevertheless, the most accurate

test, the blood gas tests which were done and the results
recorded by the nurses (T.219) indicated the definite possibility
that the intubation was improperly performed. (T.213)
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Dr. Dartf an emergency room specialist, as well as a
specialist in the treatment of venemoussnake bites, (T191-194)
testified on cross-examination, that it is not likely that the
child would have died, with proper treatment, considering the
incidence of snakebites versus the number of deaths of
snakebites. (T.225)

While being unable to apply percentages to

it, Dr. Dart testified that "...given aggressive doses of
antivenin, the victims nearly always live.

That includes some

children in the opinion as well as adults." (T.226-227)

If the

high likelihood that the child was improperly intubated (and that
fact covered up by the illegal removal of the tube before
delivering the body for an autopsy) is added to the demonstrably
and egregiously low dosages administered to the child by the
treating physician, it is clear that the gross negligence of the
treating physician caused the death of the child.
The state, during the trial, tried to demonstrate,
through the death certificate (St. Exh. 15) and the testimony of
others that the cause of death was simply from a venemous snakebite.

One cannot, of course, argue with that.

What one can

argue with is whether the venemous snakebite should have caused
the death.

Appellant submits that the evidence is clear that it

should not have and that he is not responsible for the death of
Stevie Kirkwood.
An analogy which removes the case from the hysteria
that accompanies even the mention of the word "rattlesnake" might
be two children playing together and in their rough-housing, one
suffers a small laceration on the finger.
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Unfortunately he

happens to be hemophiliac and the treating doctor mistakenly
administers a blood-thinning drug rather than a blood-coagulating
drugf and he dies.

The cause of death is going to be described

as resulting from the laceration.

It would be absurd to

attribute the cause of death to the child, however, who was
playing with him and may even have been the instrument that
inflicted the slight laceration.
In the instant case, it is admitted that most people
are deathly afraid of rattlesnakes and they become almost
hysterical when one is near or they are bitten by one.

The

evidence adduced at this trial, however, shows that while they
should be respected, they should not be so feared as they are,
and it is this court's responsibility to see through the hysteria
and the misinformation and the misperceptions that abound
concerning reptiles, and deal with the case as it truly is, an
accident.

It may even have been an accident that was caused by

negligence, but it should not have resulted in the death of the
small child.
To appellant's knowledge, the issue of such an
intervening cause has not been decided in the State ot Utah by
the courts of this state.

Therefore it is a case of first

impression and the law must be enunciated.
40 Am Jur 2nd, 304, Homicide §13 points out:

A person is not criminally responsible
for a homicide unless his act can be said to
be the cause of death. Although one may have
feloniously assaulted, beaten, or wounded
another, he is not to be deemed guilty of
homicide where the death of such other person
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results promimately from a would inflicted by
a third person or from some other intervening
cause, (Emphasis added)
•• •

It is to be noted that the tort
liability concept of proximate cause is not a
proper criterion of causation in a criminal
homicide prosecution, which requires more
direct causal connection to be shown then
will suffice to ground a civil recovery.
Section 17, page 308, states further:
..•To warrant a conviction for homicide,
the death must be the natural and probable
consequence of the unlawful act, and not the
result of an independent intervening cause in
which the accused does not participate, and
of the accused was not the proximate cause of
the death for which he is being prosecuted,
but that another cause intervened, with which
he was in no way connected, and but for which
death would not have occurred, such
supervening cause is a good defense to the
charge of homicide.
The prosecution, of course, has argued in trial, that
if the treatment is not the sole cause of the death or if there
is no evidence that is is, the mistreatment is not a defense.
Section 19 Of 40 Am Jur 2nd, is enlightening:

Of course, it is established that the
mal-treatment of a wound not in itself mortal
or dangerous, the medicine administered, or
the deceased own misconduct, and not the
wound, is the whole cause of death, the
person inflicting the wound will not be
criminally responsible for homicide. There
is some authority, moreover, for the
proposition that if doubt exists as to the
character of a wound, as to whether death is
the result thereof or of improper or
negligent treatment, the person inflicting
the wound will be absolved from
responsibility.
(Emphasis added)

34

Generally speaking some cases which have been reported
indicate that in order for there to be a defense, the
mistreatment by the attending physician must be more than mere
negligence, but rather gross or willful misconduct or negligence.
However, as pointed out in 100 ALR2nd 774, the cases which find
there is a defense arising out of mistreatment or negligence are
usually not reported because the prosecution cannot appeal.

In

the instant case, the determination was made by the court acting
without a jury and his decision my be reviewed by this court.
The court found as a matter of law that "...nothing the ..doctors
did or did not do caused Stevie's death." (Sentencing transcript
page 7)

The evidence does not support that conclusion.
The question is, was the mistreatment or mal-treatment

egregious enough to exonerate the appellant of the responsibility
tor the death?
Even the cases that find that mere negligence is
insufficient to absolve the accused, usually preface their
decisions on the term:
"...Where a person inflicts upon another a
wound which is calculated to endanger or
destroy life, it is not a defense to a charge
of homicide that the alleged victim's death
was contributed to or cause by the negligence
of the attending physicians or surgeons." See
State v. Shaffer 574 P.2d 210.
In the instant case, the court found that,
The defendant obviously had convinced
himself, in spite of the warnings that he had
received to the contrary that the snake was
not dangerous, and that there was no grave
risk of death to anyone under these
circumstances. (Sentencing Transcript, page
5)
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Consequently, he could not conceivably have "calculated" to
endanger or destroy life.
If the wound was not "calculated" to endanger or
destroy life, the mistreatment or mal-treatment of the victim by
the treating physicians may and should be a defense to the
homicide counts against appellant.
The most pertinent Utah case, though distinguishable,
and not all together appropo of the instant case, which raises
the issue of intervening cause, is State v. Velarde 734 P.2nd 449
(Utah 1986) .
In that case the defendant was accused of and convicted
of 2nd degree murder arising out of a beating, allegedly with a
stick or club.

Subsequently, upon the physicians determining

that he was "brain dead," they withdrew life support systems
which were causing his lungs to function and his heart to beat.
The defendant claimed that the removal of the support systems was
an intervening cause of death.
The Supreme Court noted; page 4 56:
The state has the burden in a homicide
case of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the death of the victim resulted
proximately from some act or omission on the
part of the defendant. If the injury
inflicted contributes immediately to the
death of the victim, the defendant is guilty
of homicide. In this case, the State
presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the injuries to
Mclntyre's head, not removal of the life
support systems, were the proximate cause of
Mclntyre's death. (Emphasis added)
The court further clarified that statement when it added,
page 456:
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However, even if the support systems
were removed prematurely, defendant would
still be responsible for Mclntyre's death
s nce
^
intervening medical error is not a
defense to a defendant who has inflicted
a mortal wound upon another. (Emphasis added)
In that case, the wound inflicted upon the victim did
and would have caused the death regardless of what medical
treatment was or was not, or might have been provided.

The

defendant there did clearly inflict a "mortal wound."
Consequently, the court ruled that removal of life support
systems, even if prematurely done, would not be a defense to the
accused.

The defendant had indeed inflicted a "mortal" wound.
The distinction in that case and this is a very great

and significant distinction.

In the instant case, the appellant

had not inflicted a "mortal wound."

The overwhelming weight of

the evidence is that rattlesnake bites rarely cause death and
almost never if properly treated within 30 minutes to an hour.
Therefore,

even if it had been a "calculated" infliction of the

bite (which it was not) it was not a "mortal wound." (T.225;
T.494; T.516)
The court erred in not permitting additional expert
testimony concerning the incidence and likelihood of death, if
properly treated, which will be mentioned, hereinafter, but upon
proffer, Mr. Glenn would have testified concerning the
unlikelihood that the child would have died as a result of the
snakebite if treated properly. (T.501-502)
In this case, testimony admitted, and unrebutted,
indicated that one and 1/3 to a maximum of one and H vial was
administered over a period of two hours (see brief supra) but
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that a minimum of 10 vials should have been administered within
the first 30 minutes, (T.510) and another 10 vials within the
next 30 minutes (T. 511) and possibly as much as 70 to 75 vials
depending upon the condition of the patient.

(T. 495)

One cannot say that the evidence even came close to
showing the appellant administered a "mortal" wound*
Furthermore, it is clear beyond doubt that if that be the
standard, the negligence of the treating physicians in this case
was not merely negligence it was gross negligence.
Mr. Glenn testified that he consults with the Poison
Control Center and with physicians across the state, "because
they know so little about the treatment of venemous snakebites."
(T. 506-b07)

Yet the treating physician did not contact The

Poison Control Center or any experts in the field, eventhough
admitting he had only treated "a couple of snakebits previously,"
even what he did do was contrary to the instructions on Exh. 17,
the insert in the antivenin package not only available to him,
but which he admits he read.
The Velarde case, supra can and should be interpreted
to hold that the only time the intervening negligence is not a
defense is if the accused has inflicted a "mortal wound."

If it

is seen, however, to hold that intervening causes or negligence
of the treating physician is never a defense, then it should be
reconsidered in light of a case similar to the instant case.
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The Court in this case ruled that:
...in order for Mr. Wessendorf to be availed
of any defense which would exonerate him from
any allegations in this case relating to the
medical treatment, he would have to show that
the medical treatment was not simply
negligent—not even grossly negligent—but he
would have to show that the actions of the
doctors were, in fact, the cause of death,
that they were an intervening cause of death,
and that they superseded his actions in the
matter and terminated the causal relationship
between what he did and the death.
I think that's the standard in Utah. I
think that's the standard in the majority of
jurisdictions, and that's going to be the
ruling of the Court. (T.500)
Appellant submits that the court is in error and that that is not
the standard in Utah. Appallant has found no cases other than the
Velarde case in Utah and does not believe that a standard has
been set, except as provided in that case.

Appellant submits

that that is not the standard enunciated by the Velarde case, but
that if it is so interpreted by trial courts, the Velarde case
needs to be revisited and clarified.

The Velarde case

plainly

limits its holding to cases where the accused inflicts a "mortal
wound" and that is not the case in this instance.
Because of its ruling on this issue, the trial court
prevented extensive evidence, that would have shown persuasively,
that the wound was not mortal and that the treatment was the real
cause of the death of the child in this case.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that the appellant
should either, (1) be exonerated and found not quilty of causing
the death of the deceased child on the grounds that there was an
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intervening cause, i.e., inadequate and grossly negligent
treatment by the treating physicians which caused the death of
the child; or (2) that the law applicable to the facts of this
case do not justify a conviction of manslaughter, because of
appellant's lack of intent and knowledge of the risk of death and
because he did net knowingly and intentionally disregard & known
risk, of which he was consciously and subjectively aware, he was
guilty at most only of Criminal Negligence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

^ / ^

day of

(Dew&&#. i;.988

MficArthur Wright
Attorney for Defendnat-Appelldnt
Darrell Lawrence Wessendorf
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ADDENDUM

Section 76-5-205 reads as follows:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes
manslaughter if the actor:
(a) recklessly causes the death of
another; or
(b) causes the death of another under
circumstances where the actor reasonably
believes the circumstances provide a legal
justification or excuse for his conduct
although the conduct is not legally
justifiable or excusable under the
existing circumstances.
(2) Under Subsection (1)(b) f emotional
disturbance does not include a condition
resulting from mental illness as definded in
Section 76-2-305.
(3) The reasonableness of an explanation or
excuse under Subsection (a) (b), or the
reasonable belief of the actor under
Subsection (a)(c), shall be determined from
the viewpoint of a reasonable person under
the then existing circumstances.
(4) Manslaughter is a felony of the second
degree.

The Negligent Homicide section, 76-5-206, reads as
follows:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal
negligence, causes the death of another.
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor.

76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or
with intent or willfully";
"knowingly, or with knowledge";
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and
"Criminal negligence or criminally
negligent."
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or
willfully with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when
it is his conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result.

(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with
respect to his conduct or to circumstances
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of
the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or
with knowledge, with respect to a result of
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct
is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or
the result of his conduct when he is aware of
but consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that its
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from
the standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise under all the circumstances as
viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is
criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the
result of his conduct when he ought to be
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the circumstances exist or the result
will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the failure to
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint. (Emphasis added)
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ST. GEORGE, UTAH; WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1988; 3:50 P.M.

2 I
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We1 re back in session.

THE COURT:

5 I minutes to 4:00 P.M.
6

Anything you want to take up before I
announce my decision?

9
10

MR. WRIGHT:

13
14

I have nothing more at this time,

Your Honor.

11
12

The defendant is present with his

counsel, as is counsel for the State.

7
8

Itfs now 10

MR. ROWE:

Nothing, Your Honor, on behalf of the

State.
THE COURT:

All right.

This case has been described as a tragic set

15

of events, and I want to underline that.

16

tragic set of events.

17

decides, there will be great dissatisfaction.

18

I'm sure no matter what this court

Let me begin by analyzing the elements of

19

second-degree murder.

20 I

is defined by the following elements:

21

I view this as a

Under the law, second-degree murder

That the defendant acted under circumstances

22

evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, and he

23

engaged in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to

24

another and thereby causes the death of another.,

25

Those elements have been analyzed by our

1

Supreme Court in the Bolsinger case and an additional

2

element added.

3

The Bolsinger elements are as follows:

That the defendant engages in conduct which

4

creates a grave risk of death to anotherf and that conduct

5

results in the death of another, number one.

6

Number two —

and this is the additional

7

element —

8

circumstances surrounding his conduct created a grave risk

9

of death to another.

10

that the defendant knew that his conduct or the

And then three, that the defendant acted

11

under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to

12

human life, which the Supreme Court has said is a

13

qualitative judgment to be made by the trier of fact.

14

As I analyze these elements, there certainly

15

is no question about the defendant causing the death of

16

another.

17

And I'll speak more on that in a few minutes.
Did he engage in conduct creating a grave

18

risk of death to another?

19

not.

Counsel has argued that he did

I find clearly that he did.

20

Even though only one or two in a thousand

21

snakebite victims die, that is clearly a grave risk of

22

death.

23

exposing the populace to snakebites on the theory that one

24

or two deaths per thousand is an acceptable risk.

25

are unacceptable figures, and snakebite clearly creates a

Under no circumstances would the law sanction

Those

1

grave risk of death, even if the odds for survival from

2

that risk are better than one might enjoy from exposure to

3

some other kinds of risks.

4

The gravity of the risk in this case, of

5

course, is escalated by the size of the snake, the size

6

and age of the child, and the location on the child's body

7

which the defendant exposed to the potential bite.

8
9

I find that element is proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.

10
11

Did the defendant know his conduct created a
grave risk of death to another?

12

I find that he did not.

The definition of "knowing" as set out in our

13

code is set out in 76-2-103 Subsection (2). The latter

14

part of that section says:

15

with knowledge with respect to a result of his conduct

16

when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to

17

cause the result."

18

"A person acts knowingly or

In order to find that the defendant knew that

19

his conduc t created a grave risk of death to anotherf I

20

wou Id have to find tha t he was reas<onably certain that if

21

he exposed that snake to Stevie, that she would be bitten

22

and die.

23

The evidence just doesn't suppor t that finding.
This is a subjective analysis which I base on

24

the facts that I've heard in the case.

25

the defendant subjecti vely believed that h e had the snake

I'm convinced that

1

calmed and somewhat under control, and that it would not

2

bite.

3

The defendant obviously had convinced

4

himself, in spite of the warnings that he had received to

5

the contrary, that the snake was not dangerous, and that

6

there was no grave risk of death to anyone under these

7

circumstances.

8
9

As I've previously said, I find the defendant
was wrong on that point.

There certainly was a grave

10

risk, and tragically he was wrong.

But in view of the

11

requirements set out in the State versus Bolsinger, that

12

the defendant knew that his act was creating a grave risk

13

of deathr I cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that he

14

had that knowledge.

15

The last element of second-degree murder is

16

the defendants act evidenced a depraved indifference to

17

human life.

18

I believe that the defendant loved Stevie

19 I Kirkwood; that he had genuine affection for other members
20

*of her family; that he had no desire or intent to harm

21

her.

22

given these facts.

23

His conduct does not evidence depraved indifference,

In Bolsinger, our Supreme Court defines

24

depraved indifference as follows:

"To constitute depraved

25

indifference, the act must be one which has been rather

1

well-understood among common law to involve something more

2

serious than recklessness, and there must be a knowing and

3

doing of an uncalled-for act in callous disregard of the

4

likely harmful effect on the victim, which is so heinous

5

as to be equivalent to the specific intent to kill. And

6

it must be characterized by unmitigated wickedness,

7

extreme inhumanity, or acts exhibiting a high degree of

8

wantonness."

9
10

The acts of Mr. Wessendorf in this case do
not sink to the level of those descriptions.

11
12

I will now analyze manslaughter, a
lesser-included offense in this case.

13

The elements of manslaughter are that the

14

defendant recklessly caused the death of another.

15

76-2-103 Subsection (3) of our code, "recklessly11 is

16

defined as follows:

17

Under

One, that the defendant is aware of a

18

substantial and unjustifiable risk with respect to his

19

conduct or the circumstances surrounding his conduct.

20

Two, that he consciously disregards that

21

risk.

22

Three, the risk is such that its disregard

23

constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care

24

that an ordinary person would exercise.

25

Four, as viewed from the defendants

standpoint.
There again is no question that the defendant
caused the death of another.

In this casef the experts

all agree that the victim died of a rattlesnake bite.
Although much has been made of the medical
treatment provided the victimf all the experts agree that
nothing the doctors did or did not do caused Stevie's
death.

It was clearly the act of the defendant in placing

the snake close enough to Stevie to inflict the bitef that
caused her death or at least was a concurrent cause of
death.
Was the defendant's act reckless?

I find

that the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt
that there was a substantial and unjustifiable and even
grave risk of death to Stevie in the defendant's act of
placing an unrestrained rattlesnake on the shoulder of
Stevie.
You will recall in the defendant's
testimony —

brief testimony this afternoon —

he

indicated that he was holding the snake four or five
inches below its head because he did not want it to feel
restrained.
I further find that the evidence clearly
shows that the defendant was aware of that risk.

As

opposed to knowing that he was going to cause a death, he
„,

rT M
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was aware of a risk.
2

And the element that I looked to to establish

3

his awareness of that risk is that the defendant picked up

4

the snake using a tire iron originally.

5

risky.

6

the same reason.

7

and others at the scene that the snake was dangerous and

8

might bite or kill someone.

He knew it was

The defendant transported the snake in a bag for

9

The defendant was warned by the Churches

Others at the scene were clearly apprehensive

10

and exhibited fear of the snake.

11

go near the snake or even enter her own home and chose to

12

go in through a window rather than approach the defendant

13

while he was holding the snake.

14

snakebite kit in his own truck to treat snake bites,

15

indicating a clear awareness of a risk attendant upon

16

snakebite.

17

Mrs. Kirkwood refused to

The defendant kept the

After the bite, the first thing the defendant

18

did was slam the bathroom door —

19

and cut the fang mark in an attempt to remove the venom,

20

again exhibiting a clear awareness of the danger of a

21

snakebite.

by his own testimony

—

The d(sfendant fought with Mrs. Kirkwood and

22

so that he could go

23

Mr. Kelton —

24

to the hospital :In the place of Mr . Kelton to continue to

25

work on Steviefs wounds -— remove more of the venom.

by h:Is own testimony

—

1

There fs no question in my mind at all that

2

the defendant was aware beyond a reasonable doubt of the

3

risks that Stevie was put to resulting from the snakebite,

4

even though he did not know that his act in placing the

5

snake close to Stevie would most certainly result in her
death,

7 J

Ifm also convinced beyond a reasonable doubt

8

that the defendant was aware that there was a substantial

9 I

and unjustifiable risk, in that the snake would bite. He

10

was aware that rattlesnakes do bite.

11

himself, several times.

12

exhibited coiling when animals such as dogs approached.

13

He was aware that Stevie had a kitten in her arms when he

14

exposed her to the snake.

15

were already upset by the presence of the snake and might

16

do something that would startle the snake and cause it to

17

strike or bite.

18

He's been bitten,

He was aware that the snake

He was aware that others around

I find the defendant consciously disregarded

19

these risks as evidenced by his decision to place the

20

snake in close proximity to Stevie in spite of the risks

21

of which he was aware.

22

It is uncontroverted in this case that the

23

ordinary person in the defendant's standpoint —

in other

24

words, trying to decide "Do I expose this child to this

25

snake or not?" —

would consider the defendant's act of
~
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placing the snake on the child fs shoulder -- which is his
version of what happened —

a gross deviation from the

standard of care which a reasonable man would exercise.
I want to note at this point that the
defendant is bound by an objective standard and not a
subjective one.

Counsel has previously argued that the

language as viewed from the act or standpoint involves
some sort of a subjective test.

Such is not the case.

If

the legislature had intended a subjective standardf they
would not have included the language relating to the
"reasonable man11 standard.

Obviously if we take a

reasonable man and then give him all the subjective
features of the defendantr there's no use in using the
"reasonable man" standard, we should simply state it as a
subjective standard.

By indicating a "reasonable man"

standard, legislature was indicating they intended an
objective test.
And I find that a reasonable man using
reasonable care in those circumstances would not have
placed a snake —

an unrestrained rattlesnake —

in that

proximity to a child.
Because of my findings stated abovef I will
not explore the elements of negligent homicide stated in
the cases counsel have cited.

The only difference between

manslaughter and negligent homicide is the perception of

1

the risk involved in the defendant's activity.
1 hav

2

e found that the defendant was aware of

3

the risks and perceived those risks, and therefore the

4

case clearly can't come under negligent homicide.,

5

I find the defendant not guilty of

6

second-degree murder as charged in the Information.

7

find the defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense

8 I

of manslaughter, a second-degree felony.

9
10

Anything else we need to take up at this
point?

11
12

MR. ROWE:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Mr. Wright, what is the defendant's

position on a presentence report?

15

MR. WRIGHT:

16

THE COURT:

17

20

Your Honor, we would concur in

requesting a presentence report, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
explain briefly.

22

report.

23

however.

25

Certainly.

MR. WRIGHT:

21

24

Could I have a moment, Your Honor?

(Discussion off the record.)

18
19

I believe it should be

referred for a presentence report.

13
14

I

All right.

Mr. Wessendorf, just let me

You have the right to have a presentence

That cannot be done without your concurrence,
That report process takes about 30 days.
During that time, the probation department

will be contacting you and asking you some questions and
•-^..ftT T T M
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1

some information which they will use to prepare the

2 I

report.

3
4

Do you agree that a presentence report should
be prepared?

5 J

MR. WESSENDORF:
THE COURT:

Yesr sir.

You should also know that there's the

possibility in a case like this that the period for
preparation of that report might extend beyond 30 days.
Maybe to as much as 45 days.
Are you willing to waive timer if
appropriatef so that that report can be prepared if it
takes 45 days?
MR. WESSENDORF:
THE COURT:

Yes.

All right.

I will refer the matter to

Adult Probation and Parole for the preparation of a
presentence report.
We'll set the matter for sentencing — what
is your feelingf Mr. Wright and Mr. Rowe?

Obviously today

being the 24thf it's not going to be done by the 17th of
March.

And the next date would be April the 11th.
MR. ROWE:

I believe April the 11th would be

appropriate.
MR. WRIGHT:
THE COURT:

Yesf sir.

That's finef Your Honor.

We will set the matter for sentencing

on April llthr 1988.
P M t f . (2
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1

And

f Mr. Wessendorf, just to make sure youfre

2

clear, are you willing to waive your right to be sentenced

3

until that date?

4

MR. WESSENDORF:

5

THE COURT:

6
7

Yes, sir.

All right.

this case?
MR. ROWE:

It's been set at $50,000.

8

no motion to reduce that.

9

MR. WRIGHT:

10

THE COURT:

11

There's been

I think it's 100,000, Your Honor.
All right.

Any motion with regard to bail?

12

MR. ROWE:

13

THE COURT:

14

What is the bail set in

I don't have any.
Bail will remain as set, then, to

guarantee the defendant's appearance.

15

We'll see you back here on the 11th,

16

Mr. Wessendorf.

17

obligation to be back here on April 11th at 9:30 in the

18

morning for sentencing, without notice.

19

appear, a warrant will be issued for your arrest.

20

If you are released on bail, it's your

Any questions about that?

21

MR. WESSENDORF:

22

THE COURT:

23

If you don't

No, sir.

Anything else we need to take up at

this time?

24

MR. ROWE:

25

MR. WRIGHT:

r> n

n^v

Nothing, Your Honor.
Not at this time, Your Honor.
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR
1RT4 - qf. Georae. Ut. (801) 673-5315
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